Executive summary
Turkey has expanded its relationships, direct or permissive, with Islamist organizations and armed nonstate actors from Gaza to Syria, and across the Maghreb and the Sahel. At the same time, Turkish-backed forces and proxies have committed serious human rights abuses and war crimes in northern Syria.
Key findings
Turkey facilitated the rise and operational capabilities of the Islamic State (ISIS), allowing it to recruit fighters, move personnel, and sustain logistical channels that strengthened the organization’s fight against Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Turkey has thus functioned as a major transit and logistical hub for jihadists for several years.
Turkey has elevated Hamas both diplomatically and operationally, hosting its leaders and normalizing the group domestically, in contradiction to U.S. terrorism designations.
Turkey’s reported material and logistical support helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) until July 8, 2025, and the Syrian National Army (SNA) consolidate power in post-2024 Syria, undermining U.S. support for the pro-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Extrajudicial killings, torture, looting, property seizures, and religious persecution by Turkish-backed factions, amounting to war crimes have been documented.
Ankara’s expansion into Africa and the Sahel includes drone sales and training, and, according to multiple reports, SADAT-linked deployments of Syrian fighters to Niger, complicating U.S. policy in the Sahel.
Turkey violated the UN arms embargo on Libya by supplying weapons and military equipment to the Government of National Accord and its allied militias. Turkish military training provided to factions in Libya was also found to violate the sanctions regime.
Proxy Fighters: Reports have indicated that Turkey deployed Syrian mercenaries, some linked to various armed groups, to fight in Libya alongside forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA).
The U.S. has condemned Turkey for the reported use of child soldiers among its mercenaries.
Syrian civil War, Turkey and ISIS
The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, created a complex battlefield involving multiple actors, including state forces, rebel groups, jihadist organizations, and Kurdish militias. One of the most controversial aspects of the conflict has been Turkey’s role and the extent to which its territory and internal networks facilitated the rise and operational capabilities of jihadist organizations, particularly the Islamic State (ISIS).
ISIS relied on cross-border infrastructure rooted in long-standing jihadist networks operating in Turkish cities, originally developed during earlier conflicts such as the Iraq War and other regional jihadist campaigns. These networks enabled recruits from Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia to enter Turkey and subsequently travel onward to Syria. Once in Syria, recruits were assigned to ISIS units and often underwent further military and ideological training. Fighters who had been radicalized within Turkey were then transferred to ISIS-controlled territory to participate in combat operations against Kurdish forces, including the People’s Protection Units, YPG, (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel in Kurdish).
Beyond serving as a transit route, Turkey also hosted recruitment and radicalization networks that supported ISIS operations. ISIS recruiters operated in several Turkish cities, identifying potential recruits and introducing them to radical religious study groups and ideological training programs. The recruitment process often involved multiple stages. Initially, local recruiters engaged individuals within their communities, inviting them to attend religious training sessions organized by informal Islamist circles. After several months of indoctrination, recruits were encouraged to pledge allegiance to ISIS and were subsequently transferred to Syria for further training and combat deployment.
In addition to recruitment and logistical support, financial networks in Turkey were linked to extremist organizations, forming part of a broader ecosystem that sustained jihadist operations in Syria. Cross-border smuggling and illicit trade, including the sale of Syrian oil through Turkey, provided substantial revenue for ISIS, which was used to purchase weapons, recruit fighters, and maintain administrative control over territory in Syria and Iraq.
Turkey, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood
On April 20, 2024, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly compared Hamas to Turkey’s War of Independence irregulars and hosted its leaders in Istanbul, actions that effectively legitimize the group within Turkey’s political discourse. Security reporting in 2025 indicated a West Bank cell receiving funding and direction from Hamas’s headquarters in Turkey, highlighting Ankara’s permissive environment. Egypt and the UAE have repeatedly accused Turkey of supporting “terrorist groups” and “Islamist militias” in Libya.
This posture conflicts with U.S. designations and sanctions on Hamas and associated Muslim Brotherhood branches, creating banking, compliance, and alliance management risks. From the beginning of his administration, the Turkish president hosted and provided a platform for Brotherhood-aligned clerical bodies (e.g., the International Union of Muslim Scholars) and provided space for exiled Muslim Brotherhood media and activists following Egypt’s 2013 coup. He ensured that the Justice and Development Party, AKP, (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in Turkish), formed in 2001, inherited both a domestic base and a transnational bridge to Brotherhood networks.
The coordinated strategy of Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood reached its peak during the so-called “Arab Spring”. A key element of this strategy was the expansion of Turkish soft power in the Greater Middle East, promoting the “Republic of Turkey” as a “model” Muslim country, one with high living standards and equal participation in the international system alongside the Great Powers.
Syria after 2024: HTS ascendancy, Turkish leverage, and friction with U.S. Partners
Turkey’s protection of Idlib, under HTS de facto control, has strengthened the group’s military and political capabilities. Analyses indicate Turkish green-lighting and potential provision of drones and logistical support for rebel offensives. Ankara directly sponsors the Syrian National Army (SNA) and has elevated proxy commanders into Syria’s reorganizing forces, reinforcing influence while engaging with units accused of violations. U.S. media and intelligence reporting as early as October 2019 showed Turkey collaborating with militias, including former al-Qaeda and ISIS members, foreshadowing today’s HTS-centric ecosystem. Turkish strikes against the U.S.-partnered Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) threaten detention stability for tens of thousands of ISIS affiliates and risk a jihadist resurgence, directly undermining a core U.S. objective.
Africa and the Sahel: Drones, training, and mercenary deployments
Turkey has emerged as a key defense partner for Sahel juntas, supplying TB2, Anka, Aksungur, and Akıncı drones, as well as armored vehicles, while Western aid was paused following recent coups. Multiple investigations report that SADAT, a Turkish private military company (PMC) linked to Ankara, has deployed approximately 1,100 Syrian fighters to Niger between 2023 and 2024 to safeguard Turkish interests, with some reportedly involved in clashes with jihadists. SADAT denies engaging in mercenary operations.
Turkey is pursuing a dual strategy, ostensibly providing training and technology to fight terrorist organizations while simultaneously serving as a major conduit for money laundering and terrorist financing. As of late 2025, reporting indicated that Ankara would deploy advisers and commandos to train Niger’s army against ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, effectively embedding Turkey as a principal security patron in the region.
Additional Case Studies
1. Financing Hezbollah
Reports in 2025 alleged that Turkish channels and flights carried cash to Beirut to support Hezbollah. Israeli officials reportedly raised the matter with the UN Security Council and visiting U.S. officials. Separate coverage in February 2025 documented a $2.5 million cash seizure from a passenger arriving from Turkey at Beirut airport. These financial flows reportedly put a purported NATO ally at odds with U.S. counterterrorism and Treasury designations.
2. Al-Sharaa’s HTS-rooted interim government and extremist integration
The post-Assad interim administration, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (a former leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), consolidated power while integrating HTS and Turkish-backed factions into state structures, creating acute risks for minority populations. According to sources, HTS dominated the initial offensive and the subsequent Military Operations Administration alongside allied Syrian National Army (SNA) and National Liberation Front units, maintaining ongoing patterns of repression in areas under its control. Independent monitors in 2025 reported restrictive policies and abuses, including dispossession, extortion, detention, and violence, targeting Christians, Druze, Kurds, Alawites, and Yazidis by HTS and SNA factions.
3. Prisoner releases/escapes of ISIS detainees amid Turkish pressure and transitions
During Turkey’s 2019 incursion, international reporting documented escapes of ISIS detainees from SDF-run facilities and camps (Ain Issa and Qamishli) as Kurdish forces were pulled off guard duty. U.S. officials warned that “many dangerous ISIS detainees” had escaped. In early 2026, additional escapes were reported during chaotic handovers of prisons from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to new authorities in eastern Syria. These incidents underscore how Turkish operations and subsequent transitions have re-seeded jihadist manpower, destabilizing Syria and undermining U.S. and coalition counterterrorism gains.
Conclusion
The aforementioned developments undermine core U.S. priorities, including counterterrorism, the protection of civilians and religious minorities, NATO cohesion, and stabilization efforts in the Levant and Africa.